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KNOWLEDGE, VIRTUE, AND ONTOTHEOLOGY:  
A KIERKEGAARDIAN (SELF-)CRITIQUE 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n his late journals of 1854-1855,1 Søren Kierkegaard argues at some length 
that faith has “not an intellectual character but an ethical character.2 He 
juxtaposes this with the “Platonic-Aristotelian definition,” alternatively the 
“whole Greek philosophical pagan definition” of faith as pistis, or that portion of 
the divided line in book 6 of Plato’s Republic that still aspires to higher and better 
knowledge.3 He faults St. Augustine and “the Alexandrians” (probably St. 
Clement and maybe Origen) for this, and he relies partly on Romans 1:5 where 
St. Paul invokes the “obedience of faith” as evidence that faith is an ethical state, 
since it is not merely a second-rate epistemic category but requires obedience in 
ways that epistemic categories, it seems, cannot. This has deep implications for 
the tradition in continental philosophy that follows, and in this paper I want to 
explore some ways that Kierkegaard’s own account of these things, and at times, 
that of others, can be subjected to an important critique coming from the virtue 
tradition.  
 
Before beginning my brief paper, it may be worth mentioning that my own 
concerns in it stem from the continental tradition in philosophy, but I also have 
training in and deep exposure to the analytic tradition in philosophy. Both 
traditions have vices and virtues. Analytic philosophers are proud of rigor and 
clarity, at which they sometimes succeed. But sometimes they rely overmuch on 
symbolism when ordinary language arguments communicate at least as clearly. 
Continental philosophers usually see themselves within a long philosophical 
                                                 
1 Below I list the abbreviations I use when referencing Kierkegaard’s works: Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, 2 vols. (vol. 1, CUP), ed. and trans. 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); 
Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks (KJN, with volume and page number), vols. 1-11, ed. 
by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Alastair Hannay, David Kangas, Bruce H. Kirmmse, George 
Pattison, Vanessa Rumble and K. Brian Söderquist (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press 2007-); The Sickness unto Death (SUD), trans. by Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals 
and Papers, 7 vols. (JP, plus volume and entry number), ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong 
and Edna H. Hong with Gregor Malantschuk (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1967); Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, vols. 1-55 (SKS, with volume, page number, notebook, 
and entry number), ed. by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Joakim Garff, Johnny Kondrup, et al. 
(Copenhagen: Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre and G.E.C. Gads Forlag 1997ff.); 
Without Authority (WA), ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997); Works of Love (WL), ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
2 SKS 26, 616 / Papir 486 / JP 2, 1154. 
3 SKS 25, 432-434 / NB30:57 / JP 1, 180. 
I 
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tradition, and often they are right to complain about ahistorical approaches to 
philosophy that obscure their debts to the past or ignore them. But there has also 
been a somewhat lamentable tendency within continental philosophy to pen 
massive works that spawn their own cottage industry of specialized (and, if we 
are honest, rather obscure) literature.  
 
The effort in this issue of the Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory is to bring 
together multiple ways of doing philosophy of religion, and specifically in the 
case of this paper, and the papers by Michael Kelly and John Greco, the analytic 
and continental traditions of philosophy of religion as they might engage debates 
concerning emotion and virtue. This general approach of “mashup philosophy of 
religion” holds out a good deal of promise, since the opposition between the two 
traditions is ultimately artificial (just try to explain the divide to a new 
philosophy student without instantly revealing your bias). We should, after all, 
desire clarity in argumentation and dogged pursuit of the truth, along with an 
acknowledgment that our position in this endeavor is greatly enhanced by the 
work of our philosophical ancestors. There are tendencies in philosophical 
method, to be sure, and there is no a priori need to disown one or the other. But 
the time when philosophers from one tradition could safely ignore the efforts of 
those in another for no better reason than prejudice is hopefully receding.  
 
KIERKEGAARDIAN CONCERNS  
 
As anyone with more than a passing acquaintance with the history of philosophy 
and theology can see, Kierkegaard’s view about the nature of faith in the 
previously noted passages does not occur in a philosophical, much less a 
theological, vacuum. In this section, I will give some indication of what I take to 
be some of Kierkegaard’s heritage and legacy that shows up in later continental 
philosophy, if only to indicate that an examination of his position has important 
repercussions to contemporary debates. Kierkegaard himself sees his concern 
about the proper status of faith as the position of St. Paul and “the Christian” 
position. Part of the idea here seems to be that Kierkegaard suspects a 
downgrading and watering-down of Christianity when he hears any sense of 
faith occupying a rung on a ladder. He is not interested in improving upon faith; 
he is interested in faithful obedience, and he does not see this as a matter of 
degree. No doubt he also suspects a Hegelian element of making Christian faith 
into “picture thinking” that should be surpassed by absolute knowing.4 While 
Kant saw it necessary to deny knowledge to make room for faith,5 he also saw 
presumption in the philosophical work of rationalists like Descartes. 
Kierkegaard, too, sees presumption when faith is relegated to an intellectual 
category. This reflects another of his stark juxtapositions, namely, the apostle and 
the genius. Although someone could be both, Kierkegaard (or at any rate, his 
pseudonym, H.H.) seems to think that St. Paul did not rank very high as far as 
                                                 
4 See G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), 475. It may be worth noting that it is common to hear that Hegel took the 
insights of Kant and retrieved along with them some of the insights of Aristotle, who is 
clearly within Heidegger’s sights as a villain in the ontotheological story.  
5 See the Preface to the Second Edition, Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. 
Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965), 29.  
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his genius was concerned.6 What is decisive is his apostolic authority, and to 
praise him for his genius is missing the point that “Christianity is existential.”7  
 
Many critiques of what is now called “ontotheology” display related concerns. 
Heidegger’s famous line that “Before the causa sui, man can neither fall to his 
knees in awe nor can he play music and dance before this god,”8 reflects a sense 
that it is the life of the believer, the life of worship, that is lost when “God” 
becomes little more than an internal demand in one’s tidy philosophical system. 
As Calvin O. Schrag puts it, can a being of the sort we find in classical theistic 
arguments “sustain our concrete religious interests”?9 While this is clearly part of 
Kierkegaard’s concern, and I do want to keep the focus on Kierkegaard if only 
for reasons of my own competence, nonetheless, I think it is worthwhile to 
appreciate the relevance his concern has in later philosophy.  
 
While thinkers after the so-called “theological turn” in phenomenology take 
different paths in terms of how to answer the Heideggerian question of how the 
deity enters into philosophy,10 they tend to share the sense that ontotheology, or 
the attempt to inscribe God within a system of philosophizing that has God 
entering into philosophy on our terms rather than God’s, is a serious mistake. 
Levinas, for instance, pointed away from Descartes’s proof for God’s existence, 
by which Descartes sought to become one of the “masters and possessors of 
nature” (and perhaps of God in some sense),11 to the rupture of ordinary 
consciousness Descartes discovered in his thought of God, of the infinite. Despite 
his shortcomings, Descartes was astute enough to note, as does Levinas, that the 
thought of God, as infinite, must be somehow prior, in him, than the thought of 
the finite.12 For Levinas, this meant that the infinite is “behind intentionality,”13 
and that the infinite, or God, is never able to come within our direct intentional 
consciousness (or it would be finite). In ways that at times recall Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonymous text Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Levinas argued that this 
desire always propelled us toward the other because the desire for the infinite 
that is ignited by this awakening to the infinite requires us not to remain stuck in 
the immanence of our finite selves; we must go outside of ourselves to the other. 
Nevertheless, as it concerns God, we can never thematize God, and there is no 
end in sight in Levinas to the way in which we are constantly called to the 
human other.  
 
                                                 
6 SKS 11, 97-98 / WA, 93-94. 
7 SKS 24, 259 / NB23:107 / JP 4, 3861.  
8 Martin Heidegger, “The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics,” in The Religious, 
ed. John D. Caputo (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 67-75,74.  
9 Calvin O. Schrag, God as Otherwise than Being (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
2002), 68.  
10 See Heidegger, “The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics,” 74.  
11 See part six of René Descartes, Discourse on Method, trans. Donald A. Cress 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), 35.  
12 See part three of René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, 3rd edition, trans. 
Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), p. 31 and Emmanuel 
Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak, 
Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 
129-148,. 137.  
13 See Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” 138.  
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When we consider this legacy as it gets transmitted to Jacques Derrida and Jean-
Luc Marion, we notice their shared concerns even while we can see their 
differences. In John D. Caputo’s apt language, Marion “proposes a radical 
phenomenology of a saturating givenness, a phenomenological description of an 
event, or the possibility of an event, of bedazzling brilliance, given without 
being, visited upon us beyond comprehension, leaving us stunned and lost for 
words.”14 In contrast, Caputo notes that, for Derrida this event is “never given, 
that is always deferred.”15 Indeed, “the very idea of a Messiah who is never to 
show and whom we accordingly desire all the more is the very paradigm of 
deconstruction.”16 Again, while it is clear both are nervous about different types 
of things under the umbrella of a suspicion of ontotheology, they both seem to 
share the overarching concern expressed by Kierkegaard.  
 
At this point it is worth noting that Kierkegaard’s own worries about faith as 
existential, which I have been suggesting can be translated into worries about 
ontotheology, though perhaps not exhausted by them, are not simply confined to 
faith being an ethical category, but rather to faith being a particular sort of ethical 
category. In The Sickness Unto Death, the Kierkegaardian pseudonym Anti-
Climacus writes “the opposite of sin is not virtue but faith,”17 calling this “one of 
the most decisive definitions for all Christianity.” Why, one might wonder, is this 
so decisive? If we turn to Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, some answers may await 
us. In that important text, Kierkegaard decries both “habit”18 and “merit”19 for 
reasons that may be significant for us to consider.  
 
Kierkegaard sees love as only enacted when it is unconditional; a participation in 
the love of God. God’s love is eternal and unconditional, and our participation in 
it should reflect that. There are many impostors when it comes to Christian love, 
but there is only one genuine article, namely, unconditional love and it comes 
through the submission of faith and the immediate response of love. Since love 
must be unconditional, it cannot await any particular characteristics that it might 
deem lovely or not. It must love in response to the command “you shall love.” 
Only by love becoming a duty, says Kierkegaard, can it truly be unconditional 
and independent. Kierkegaard writes “only eternity’s you shall – and the listening 
ear that wants to hear this shall – can save you from habit.”20 Kierkegaard 
associates habit with the deadening of zeal and ardor, whereas he sees truly 
Christian love as a pure response to the command of God to love the neighbor. 
This command is either heeded or it is not, and there seems little room for degree 
here. The similarity to Martin Luther, with his protests against Aristotle and the 
whole scholastic tradition, is, I think, not accidental.  
 
In his Disputation Against Scholastic Theology, Luther writes “For an act to be 
meritorious, either the presence of grace is sufficient, or its presence means 
                                                 
14 See John D. Caputo, “Apostles of the Impossible: On God and the Gift in Derrida and 
Marion,” in God, The Gift, and Postmodernism, ed. John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 185-222, 185.  
15 Caputo, “Apostles of the Impossible, 185.  
16 Caputo, “Apostles of the Impossible,” 186.  
17 SKS 11, 196 / SUD, 82. 
18 SKS 9, 43-45 / WL, 36-37. 
19 SKS 9, 378 / WL, 385. 
20 SKS 9, 44 / WL, 37. 
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nothing.”21 The idea here seems to be that merit is either totally accomplished by 
grace, or it is not accomplished at all. Indeed, there seems no need to tack on a 
concept of personal virtue here,22 since, in the lapidary phrasing of the Lutheran 
World Federation, righteousness is “always complete.”23 The suggestion of an 
immediacy in grace that would be in tension with dispositions and virtues of a 
person’s own is further corroborated by Luther’s statement in Thesis 41 of the 
same disputation that “Virtually the entire Ethics of Aristotle is the worst enemy 
of grace.”24  
 
Kierkegaard takes the same intuition to be effective against the very notion of 
merit itself. Twice, in Works of Love, he attacks merit,25 but he also indicates that 
we are put in a kind of infinite “debt” by love, one from which we should never 
seek relief. This seems to be because we should never dwell on ourselves in love, 
thinking that we have perhaps made a “part-payment” on the debt.26 Rather, our 
debt is itself the blessed life of love in which there is no room for comparison 
among lovers. For my part, I find the immediacy of love in Kierkegaard to be 
paralleled in some interesting ways by the way we are held hostage by the other 
in Levinas, and must respond to the call of the other in the face of our neighbor.27 
My goal in this section has been merely to outline what I take to be some 
Kierkegaardian worries about the right sort of understanding of Christian faith, 
and to point to ways in which the view Kierkegaard holds is significant in terms 
of its impact on later thought and debt to earlier thought, especially in the 
continental philosophical tradition. In the next section, I will subject these views 
to some scrutiny even while I hope to keep in step with some things that remain 
Kierkegaardian in spirit.  
  
A KIERKEGAARDIAN (SELF-)CRITIQUE 
 
What we’ve seen thus far is that Kierkegaard’s insistence upon faith as an 
existential, and not an intellectual, category seems in harmony with some aspects 
of the critique of ontotheology that is formative for later continental thought. But 
another thing that is important about Kierkegaard’s concept of faith is that it is 
the gateway to Christian love. In faith, we encounter “the god in time,” Jesus 
                                                 
21 Thesis 54 in Luther, Disputation Against Scholastic Theology in Selected Writings of Martin 
Luther 1517-1520, ed. Theodore G. Tappert, vol. 1 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 39.  
22 Consider, too, Karl Barth’s discussion of the life of “thankful obedience” in the 
Reformed tradition’s Heidelberg Catechism. He writes “It speaks only of being sorry for our 
sins. No catalogue of virtues is given. It is enough that this life is the work of grace and 
that good works proceed from it alone. Only that is required, but that is required. The 
question whether I can do even this little thing is quite pointless. Because that is required 
of me, nothing is asked of me except that I be one who is redeemed!” (Barth, Learning Jesus 
Christ through the Heidelberg Catechism, trans. Shirley C. Guthrie, Jr. (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1964), 139). 
23 See the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification by the Lutheran World Federation and 
the Catholic Church, 39 available at: 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/documents/rc_pc_c
hrstuni_doc_31101999_cath-luth-joint-declaration_en.html.  
24 See Luther, Disputation Against Scholastic Theology, 38.  
25 SKS 9, 12 and 378 / WL, 4 and 385. 
26 SKS 9, 177 / WL, 177. 
27 I think, in particular, of The Proximity of the Other, chapter 6 in Alterity and Transcendence, 
trans. Michael B. Smith (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 97-109.  
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Christ, and we are given access, through the forgiveness of sins,28 to the “quiet 
lake” of divine love from which a human being’s love originates.29 Kierkegaard 
puts a good deal of emphasis on this metaphor, and it works pretty well for him. 
It echoes well with the biblical text (St. Paul tells of the love of God being poured 
into our hearts through the work of the Spirit in Romans 5:5); it preserves the 
unconditionality of God’s love (what with the love being God’s and all); and it 
jibes well with the immediacy of love in his thought. There is something it 
doesn’t do very well, however. It doesn’t give us a very clear sense of human 
agency.  
 
This point harkens back to St. Thomas Aquinas’s critique of Peter Lombard’s 
view of love. Lombard argued that the love with which we love our neighbor is 
itself the Holy Spirit,30 and Aquinas wanted to argue that we possessed, instead, 
a created disposition of charity that is nevertheless placed within us and caused 
by the Holy Spirit.31 There is no need here to rehearse Aquinas’s particular 
concerns in detail. Aquinas thought Lombard’s view problematic for a number of 
reasons, but the two main ones are that he thought it could not make sense out of 
the voluntariness of human action, and that it would not make sense of the 
concept of charity as a virtue. For the sake of coming back to home base, it’s 
worth pointing out that Kierkegaard seems a good fit for Lombard’s camp, since 
he claims, quite explicitly, that “The love-relationship requires threeness: the 
lover, the beloved, the love – but the love is God.”32 So Kierkegaard’s account of 
love, which is central to his thought, might well be thought to be in tension with 
some traditional aspects of the concepts of virtue and dispositions.  
 
But in recent years, a number of Kierkegaard scholars have been focused on 
trying to free Kierkegaard from the perception that his thought is inimical to the 
classical virtue tradition. I have argued elsewhere that I do not think this is a 
tension that can ever be totally dissolved in Kierkegaard’s work,33 but I do think 
that these scholars do well to bring our attention to ways in which Kierkegaard’s 
concepts do not always cohere with what seem to be his mainly Lutheran views, 
either. For instance, Mark A. Tietjen rebuts several objections to viewing 
Kierkegaard within the virtue tradition,34 and Robert C. Roberts argues 
effectively that Kierkegaard seems to have “virtuist” leanings when it comes to 
the idea of hope.35 Still, what I think these contributions usually show is that 
Kierkegaard is tacitly or implicitly using a “virtuist” framework on certain topics 
but this is always in tension with what he seems explicitly to say about virtue and 
theological and moral frameworks in which the concept of virtue is at home. This 
                                                 
28 See especially SKS 7, 530-532 / CUP, 583-85. 
29 SKS 9, 16-18 / WL, 9-10. 
30 See Lombard, The Sentences: Book 1: The Mystery of the Trinity, distinction 17, trans. Giulio 
Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2007).  
31 See Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues, Question 2, article 1, ed. E. M. Atkins and 
Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
32 SKS 9, 124 / WL, p. 121. 
33 See Jack Mulder, Jr., “Grace and Rigor in Kierkegaard’s Reception of the Church 
Fathers,” in A Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. Jon Stewart (Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming).  
34 See Mark A. Tietjen, “Kierkegaard and the Classical Virtue Tradition,” Faith and 
Philosophy, 27 (2010): 153-73. 
35 See Roberts, “The Virtue of Hope in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses,” in Robert L. 
Perkins, ed., International Kierkegaard Commentary: Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, vol. 5 
(Macon: Mercer University Press, 2003), 181-203.  
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observation does nothing to temper my admiration of Tietjen and Roberts, and 
only very little does it temper my admiration of Kierkegaard, but it does mean to 
me that Kierkegaard cannot always have everything that he wants. Thus, this is 
the space where I want to mount a Kierkegaardian (self-)critique.  
 
What is interesting about Kierkegaard’s concept of the self is that it is both 
descriptive and normative. The self, Anti-Climacus writes, “is a relation that 
relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates itself to another.”36 That 
is, as George Pattison puts it, the self is “not an individual substance of a rational 
essence but a being in dynamic and temporally charged ecstatic and open 
dependence on God.”37 While it is true that the self is related to God in some 
manner whether it wants to be or not, the self is only fully what it is intended to 
be, and in some sense really is, when that relationship is harmonious, or 
“transparent.”38 Yet, the love in which we find our blessed life issues forth 
immediately from this transparent relationship with God, so the idea of 
acquiring a “habit” seems to Kierkegaard to rest on one’s previous achievements 
in love and move the immediacy of love from the command of God (where he 
thinks it belongs) to the disposition of the person. Rather, for Kierkegaard, we 
should always begin anew in the life of Christian love.  
 
But need Kierkegaard be so suspicious of habit? It must surely be true that 
Christians should respond in obedience to God’s commands to love the 
neighbor. It must surely be true that we cannot grow idle and rest on the laurels 
of our past deeds in love. But what real lover would do so? Indeed, it has become 
something of a truism that a mark of love is that it grows. What lover would not 
want to be more ready and disposed to love precisely in obedience to the 
command, or perhaps better, the wish, of the beloved? This does require constant 
recommitment, and a willingness to be transformed by that commitment. In that 
sense, we are always beginning, but each day the race begins at a new point. It is 
always possible to disqualify oneself and need to be reinvited to join this race, 
but it is not impossible to envision progress in it. Again, it may be that aspects of 
Kierkegaard’s thought are compatible with this view, but I believe that it is in 
real tension with other significant aspects of his overall thought. Thus, the 
Kierkegaardian self-critique. 
 
I believe a similar critique needs to be made when it comes to Kierkegaard’s view 
of natural theology. Again, recent Kierkegaard scholarship has argued, to a large 
extent, effectively, I think, that Kierkegaard’s religious epistemology has a good 
deal in common with externalist models of knowledge in the analytic tradition.39 
To see this, note that despite his disavowals of standard natural theological 
arguments, Kierkegaard writes “just as no one has ever proved it [i.e., God’s 
existence],40 so has there never been an atheist, even though there certainly have 
                                                 
36 SKS 11, 130 / SUD, 13-14. 
37 See Pattison, “Philosophy and Dogma: The Testimony of an Upbuilding Discourse,” in 
Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard, ed. Edward F. Mooney (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2008), 155-162, 161.  
38 SKS 11, 130 / SUD, 14. 
39 See C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self (Waco: Baylor University Press, 
2006) and chapter 1 of Jack Mulder, Jr., Kierkegaard and the Catholic Tradition: Conflict and 
Dialogue (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).  
40 This bracketed phrase is mine. The next is the Hongs’ in their translation.  
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been many who have been unwilling to let what they knew (that the God [Guden] 
exists) get control of their minds.”41 What this passage seems to say is that there 
is an awareness of God’s existence in everyone, though this can be diminished or 
weakened by factors having to do with the will. While sin seems to me to be part 
of the equation, I might add that sin has cultural and systemic repercussions, so 
that culpability may not be as simple as Kierkegaard’s claim seems at first to 
suggest.  
 
The Kierkegaardian self-critique can be redeployed at this point. Kierkegaard’s 
own statements (and there are others like the one I quoted)42 suggest that there is 
a framework for what Alvin Plantinga might call a “basic belief” in everyone, 
though this can be marred by sin.43 The interesting thing about basic beliefs, 
however, is that they presuppose a certain threshold beyond which very specific 
beliefs or beliefs not integrally related to what Plantinga might call the design 
plan are not basic but can be arrived at by inference from beliefs that may 
perhaps be basic. Thus, I cannot infer the reliability of sense-perception but I can 
arrive at other beliefs that are not basic by taking the data of sense-perception to 
be basic. Similarly, if one has any kind of non-inferential basic beliefs in one’s 
catalogue of beliefs, one will no doubt have some kind of discriminating line to 
draw between those that are basic and those that aren’t. Some beliefs, such as a 
version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (and of course there are many), 
which is famously important for the Cosmological Argument for God’s 
existence,44 certainly seem to be among the beliefs Aristotle took to be non-
inferentially justified. And it is difficult to know why someone who thought 
God’s very existence might be non-inferentially basic might not hold that some 
version of a principle so fundamental that our world makes little sense without it 
could not also be non-inferentially justified. So, Kierkegaard, where is the line 
and why?   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
At this point, a common complaint from Kierkegaardian circles might echo a 
journal entry of his that notes “it is one thing to prove God’s existence while 
standing on one’s leg and something quite different to thank him on one’s 
knees.”45 Quite true. One way of putting this complaint might be to ask what role 
for faith such a proof could possibly have other than distracting someone from 
the all-important existential dimension of Christian faith? But I am not convinced 
there is no role. In a famous episode from the movie A Beautiful Mind, John Nash 
uses reason to prove to himself that his illusory college roommate is in fact 
illusory.46 He proves to himself that he's hallucinating.  Might it be possible to 
imagine some forms of natural theology as a bit of medicine to prove to 
ourselves that without God our systems are not ultimately sane? In our current 
                                                 
41 JP, 3:3606 / PF, 191-92. 
42 See chapter 1 of Mulder, Kierkegaard and the Catholic Tradition. 
43 See Plantinga’s Warrant trilogy, but especially Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993) for the fundamentals of the theory.  
44 See William L. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (New York: Fordham University Press, 
1998).  
45 SKS 19, 219-220 / Not7:57 / KJN, 3, p. 215. 
46 A Beautiful Mind, dir. Ron Howard, perf. Russell Crowe, Ed Harris, Jennifer Connelly, et 
al.: Imagine Entertainment, 2001.  
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philosophical climate of brains in vats, zombies, and all the rest, I would count 
such an awareness as a providential help, one that might help me embrace a 
revelatory event more readily. To me, this is a “religious interest” of mine, to 
echo Schrag’s language, one that I am happy to believe God chose, in freedom, to 
honor. I would certainly not deny God this right. 
 
Some might allege that this position is simply ontotheology and comes with all of 
its problems. But I believe that some ways of construing problems in 
ontotheology are actually themselves ontotheological problems. If that is the 
case, then sometimes opposition to ontotheology can become a certain cottage 
industry with its own clearly marked terrain for where God can and cannot, 
appear. Thus, Heidegger’s question of how God enters into philosophy can 
prove to commit the fallacy of complex question. D.C. Schindler helpfully writes 
on this point that “Because it is philosophy that clears the space for the possibility 
of faith, philosophy by that very fact establishes the parameters within which 
faith must occur, if it is to occur at all. Notice the essential connection: a modesty 
that withdraws a priori is a presumption that sets the conditions of possibility”47 
In other words, the critique of ontotheology, at its worst, can be a form of false 
modesty. This is not to say that there cannot be real (and laudable) modesty in 
critiques of ontotheology. But just as concern over ontotheology resists Hegelian 
presumption in eclipsing faith through reason, so, too should faithful 
philosophers of religion resist the presumption of a priori restricting reason’s role 
in the creature’s feeble movement toward repentance and faith. Thus I am 
concerned that really leaving the agenda open to God’s own appearing in the 
manner God might choose requires us to be open to the idea that such an 
appearance might coincide with some of what has been given to reason as a kind 
of preliminary revelation. If that’s ontotheology (or perhaps better, with 
Schindler, “theo-ontology”48), then so much the worse for the critique of 
ontotheology.  
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